Posted by Heraplem
Christopher Hitchens has issued what he thinks is a serious challenge to theists: name a single moral action that theists can perform but that atheists can’t.
But what, precisely, is the point behind this challenge? Are there really swarms of theistic philosophers out there meticulously tallying up all the possible kinds of moral actions and declaring that atheists are limited to performing a fewer number of them than theists? I tend to doubt that. (One might well challenge Hitchens, in turn, to name a single such philosopher.) What Hitchens’ challenge reveals, if anything, is that he hasn’t understood the problematic metaethical implications that many philosophers believe a strict atheistic and materialistic ontology (such as his own) would generate. The problem has nothing to do with how many moral actions atheists can perform in comparison with theists. Hitchens’ challenge — if it can be called a challenge at all — is quite literally off-topic.
What the problem does have to do with is accounting for the existence and objectivity of the normative force — the ought-to-be-ness — of certain states of affairs, as well as the truth of various moral statements. Hitchens needs to explain how it is that moral properties exist, independently of human minds, in a universe that he would like us to believe sprang into existence from thoroughly amoral, non-rational, mindless nothingness. What is it in virtue of which objective morality nevertheless exists in such a universe, according to Hitchens? Pointing out that atheists can perform as many moral actions as theists is not a relevant answer.
Hitchens would not want to respond by rejecting the assumption that moral facts or properties exist; that is, he would not wish to deny moral realism. Otherwise, it would be difficult to make serious sense of his moral complaints against religion. Despite his “challenge”, then, Hitchens still has quite a bit of explaining to do.
Hitchens might well be responding far less to theistic moral philosophers than he is to the general (and most importantly, voting) public. There is, unless I am mistaken, still a significant portion of the religious population in America (and elsewhere, to a lesser degree) which thinks that of atheism as immoral. Not “incapable of grounding their ethical beliefs properly,” but IMMORAL. There is a very wide-spread belief among some theists, for instance, that atheists are morally incapable of performing the job of president of the US. Perhaps Hitchens’ challenge is directed at people like that; if so, I think it is a point well taken. I do agree with you, however, that the challenge is hardly going to solve the dilemma that often arises between atheism and objective moral norms.
This overcomplicates the challenge massively, and misunderstands the point. Hitchens is definitely not in the business of demonstrating the pre-existence of some ‘eternal’ moral values extraneous to humanity that are stored somewhere in the fabric of creation, in some celestial filing cabinet marked ‘RULES FOR HUMANS’. That would be drastically “off-topic” if you are following his argument. Instead his contention is that morality, or the ability to recognise and systemise it, is innate within human beings and is not handed to them by some creator figure who preceded the human race and who created an eternal legal system to govern their behaviour. It is thus, contends Hitchens, that humanity had no need to wait years for a trip to Mount Sinai to find out that murder was wrong, and that coveting your neighbour’s things might lead to trouble. Imagine if that were true! “Oh, I didn’t realise that murder was bad when I killed your father!”, “Sorry for stealing your things and sleeping with your wife all these years – now that Moses has relayed the Lord’s commands I realise that this was pretty appalling behaviour! I had no idea before” Also, can you imagine someone randomly attacking a person, and for the attacked person to require some kind of religious ethical system to tell her that she was being wronged?).
So, the challenge still stands: can you think of an ethical dictum or statement, or action that was made/performed by a religious believer that couldn’t be thought of, or performed just as well by someone who doesn’t believe in such things?
Yes, Damian, we can be sure that Hitchens is not in the business of showing that there are, as you put it, “celestial filing cabinets marked ‘rules for humans’”. In fact, I know of nobody who is in the business of supporting that view. But he had better be in the business of affirming moral realism — roughly, the view that objective moral properties (or facts or truths) exist. Otherwise, one can make very little sense of the basis for his moral complaints against religion.
You stress that Hitchens thinks atheists can recognize morality and perform moral actions, as though I’ve failed to understand him on this score. To the contrary, that is precisely how I understand Hitchens’ view. And as my entry was concerned with showing, the challenge to theists that he builds from such a view is largely irrelevant to the real metaethical difficulties confronting his atheism.
Perhaps it would help to have a proper grasp of how philosophers commonly map out the terrain of metaethics. The issue of whether and how humans can come to recognize (or know) moral truths falls within moral epistemology, which is a sub-branch of metaethics. This is the issue you seem to be concerned with. But if you go back and read my entry carefully, Damian, you’ll see that it was concerned not with moral epistemology, but with moral metaphysics, a separate sub-branch of metaethics. You shouldn’t confuse these areas. When asked to provide an adequate metaphysical explanation for the existence of objective moral properties in a universe that (as Hitchens would have us believe) accidentally sprang into existence from nothingness — with no moral or rational cause to speak of — it does no good to respond with, “Ah, but I have an innate ability to recognize morality!” To answer in this way is to completely miss the point of the question. Worse, it is to make an elementary mistake of confusing epistemology with metaphysics.
Keep in mind, Heraplem, that the injunction that we have an innate ability to recognize morality does not have to be a response to a request to ground morality objectively. It could be that Hitchens is completely ignoring the metaphysical aspects of the debate at the moment. I don’t think he can ignore them forever, of course, nor can any atheist. However, the point remains that, if it is true that, whatever the metaphysical status of moral grounding, we do indeed all have an innate ability to recognize what is right and wrong, then we need no religious or theistic commitments in order to recognize what is moral and what is not. The atheist is just as capable of moral action as the theist is, though for all we know it might turn out that the atheist was confused about the metaphysics behind all that. But the metaphysics is not necessary in order to put one’s beliefs into action. That, I think, is or should be at least part of Hitchens’ point, no?
Nadroj,
Right, it would appear that Hitchens is completely ignoring the deeper metaethical problems at this time. This serves to underscore my point. His “challenge” is superficial and it’s a distraction from the real issues. I know of not a single intelligent theist who has argued that atheists are literally incapable of performing actions that are right or wrong. On the other hand, I do know of several intelligent theists (and atheists) who think there is a serious tension between moral realism and atheism. How long Hitchens plans on ignoring this latter group is anyone’s guess.
I agree with you when you say “the metaphysics is not necessary in order to put one’s beliefs into action.” Of course many moral actions are such that we have to perform them without even having any time to first think about the metaphysical basis of morality. But to the extent that Hitchens wishes to engage in the “great debate” between theism and atheism, it does him no good to simply ignore the key issues.
By the way, J.L. Mackie is an example of an atheist who would agree that there is a tension (better: an incompatibility) between moral realism and atheism. Mackie correctly observed that the intrinsic action-guidance of objective moral properties cannot be had by the wholly natural properties on which they supposedly supervene. So any supervenience relation between moral properties and amoral ones would have to be synthetic. As Mackie went on to argue, this would
Of course, Mackie’s way out of this was to deny altogether the existence of objective moral properties. It would be exceedingly strange, however, for popular atheist celebrities and nonphilosophers like Hitchens, Dawkins, et al. to take Mackie’s way out. For then they would destroy any basis for their moral complaints against perverted forms of religon.
Heraplem,
You write: “Yes, Damian, we can be sure that Hitchens is not in the business of showing that there are, as you put it, “celestial filing cabinets marked ‘rules for humans’”. In fact, I know of nobody who is in the business of supporting that view. But he had better be in the business of affirming moral realism — roughly, the view that objective moral properties (or facts or truths) exist. Otherwise, one can make very little sense of the basis for his moral complaints against religion.”
I disagree that Hitchens is here obliged to demonstrate that “objective moral properties (or facts or truths) exist.” Why? His challenge is very specifically made to those who claim that religious belief makes one a better person morally, or that to believe in a religious system is morally better, claims that are often heard from the religious and which usually go something along the lines of: ‘Without religion human beings have no need to behave well towards each other and humanity will go to the dogs without it’. The challenge is there to point out the absurdity of this claim: ‘Well, go on then, describe such a scenario to me – when the religious will always behave better than the atheist, where we actually need religion in order to behave well’.
Your reply side-steps the thrust of this challenge by asking something else of it. The challenge is designed to attack religion’s often-made claims to moral superiority, or claims to be the fount of morality, and thereby to cast doubt on its moral authority. Remember that religions are totalising systems of morality, that have often asked (and still are asking) to govern the lives of human beings, i.e., to be in authority over them. Thus the challenge is making a point in favour of atheism, in that religion is clearly not needed in order to outline what good moral behaviour is, to inspire good moral behaviour or to ensure good moral behaviour is enacted. If at least an equally good (for the sake of argument) morality can be thought of and adhered to by atheists – what need religious belief?
Hitchens’ challenge then is not an attempt to provide a total, final argument for atheism and where its morality might come from, it is there to make a specific point, and one in which it succeeds, to whit: religious belief cannot lay claim to superior abilities morally than atheism (unless of course it can answer this challenge!).
As to your implied points – well, morality exists as part of evolved human nature, it has no need to exist somewhere in the universe beyond where it does, that is in the relation of one human being to another, partly wired into human brains and partly learnt. One only has to make a quick thought experiment – if there are no human beings, do we need morality? Of course not, morality exists because we exist, without morality humanity would be unable to function in the co-operative way that it largely does. Morality has no need to exist objectively in any way beyond its roots in the relations of human person to human person; it is simply not in existence in any other sense. One might as well ask where in the universe the store of ‘love’ is kept that people draw upon; it is not a physical thing in this sense.
Regarding objective morality, it seems the burden of proof here lies more heavily on the religious – the atheist has science on his side. Surely religious persons do in fact believe in a species of ‘celestial filing cabinet marked RULES FOR HUMANS’, or at least that there was some being who created everything, and that these rules existed in that being’s consciousness before being handed down to humanity. Is the celestial filing cabinet really that much stranger than burning bushes, golden plates, or tablets of stone?
There is a long literature examining the origin of morality, from Hobbes to modern evolutionary theory. Humans have need to get along with each other, and have evolved extremely complex systems in order to do so. This speaks for the case that the existence of morality has nothing to do with cosmic creator beings. It speaks for the atheist. The believer can only point to the same texts that he has been pointing to for centuries and say ‘Well, I have no proof as such, but I have been told that this is how it happened and that is what I believe’. Beyond anything else – consider this for evidence: the fact that morality surely existed before the existence of religious texts (remember that it was only, for instance, with the tablets of stone on Mount Sinai that Judaism apparently learnt that murder was wrong – what was humanity up to before this, murdering guiltlessly?) and will exist after them. Surely this fairly elementary point – salient to all the great monotheisms – that is made in Hitchens “God is not Great” – should really shake the idea that morality is something handed to humanity by celestial beings. The unanswerability of Hitchens’ challenge, coupled with this obvious fact of humanity’s possession of moral sense prior to tablets of stone, or angelic dictation to Mohammed in medieval Arabia, is enough to tell us that morality does not come to us from some being who existed before the universe began (but who only chose to speak to us using bizarre methods, and a long, long time after human time had started).
To ask so much of this particular challenge – that it make a complete case for atheism – (and as if Hitchens has said nothing else on the subject!), and to dismiss it grounds it makes no claims for, is to take that challenge in a very disingenuous spirit, and to fail to answer its implications.
That was quite a mouthful, Damian. You begin by disagreeing that Hitchens should have to affirm moral realism. But then, if there is no objective right or wrong, what sense are we to make of the basis for his moral complaints about religion?
You suggest that Hitchens’s challenge is primarily intended to point out that atheists are just as capable as theists when it comes to behaving ethically, that atheists can discern right from wrong without having to adopt a particular religious belief, and so on. Right; and this is why his challenge is not as relevant and challenging as he wishes. It amounts to reiterating something that nearly all intelligent theists would gladly concede. We already know that both atheists and theists are capable of acting morally. You’re correct, therefore, to point out that I’m “asking something else” of his challenge. Indeed, I’ve asked that Hitchens begin addressing the real problems with respect to his atheism and the ontological grounding of morality.
And so have others. In his recent debate with theologian Douglas Wilson, for instance, Hitchens lays out his challenge and unreservedly asks “any reader” to accept it, as though he’s doing heavy-lifting for atheism. Wilson responds with ease that Hitchens continues to “miss the point.” And Wilson was right. Wilson was dealing on an explanatory level that Hitchens strayed quite far from.
Much of what you say in the rest of your reply is in need of clarification before I can offer a response. For example, you say, “morality exists as part of evolved human nature, it has no need to exist somewhere in the universe beyond where it does, that is in the relation of one human being to another, partly wired into human brains and partly learnt.” What do you mean by “morality” here? Are you talking about objective moral properties? Or what? Are you trying to say that what’s right and wrong depends on the various relations humans bear to each other? What does that mean?
Let’s continue. You take yourself to have provided a thought experiment against moral realism by asking “If there are no human beings, do we need morality?” The answer is in your question, Damian: “we” wouldn’t be here to need it. But how this thought experiment shows that objective moral properties don’t exist is a mystery.
You say later on, “Morality has no need to exist objectively in any way beyond its roots in the relations of human person to human person; it is simply not in existence in any other sense.” Again, are you suggesting that what’s right and wrong depends on relations that humans stand in to each other?
You say that with respect to objective morality, “the burden of proof is on the religious.” Are you trying to say that religious people are really the ones that need to demonstrate that an objective morality exists? That would be strange, Damian, given that many atheists have also felt the need to demonstrate the existence of objective morality.
You say, “the atheist has science on his side.” And your argument for this is, where? I trust you’ll provide it in your next reply. You can begin by making it clear how you’re defining “atheism” and “science”.
Your next paragraph is even more unclear, as you seem to be comparing God to a “species” of a “celestial filing cabinet” (whatever exactly you mean by that). Here it is:
“Surely religious persons do in fact believe in a species of ‘celestial filing cabinet marked RULES FOR HUMANS’, or at least that there was some being who created everything, and that these rules existed in that being’s consciousness before being handed down to humanity. Is the celestial filing cabinet really that much stranger than burning bushes, golden plates, or tablets of stone?”
Damian, if you can’t make any relevant conceptual distinctions between a “species of a filing cabinet” and a divine creator, then I’m not sure we’ll make much progress in this discussion. Perhaps you’re using God and a “filing cabinet” together just to make a rhetorical point? In that case, I’m even less sure that we’ll make any progress in this discussion.
You say in your last paragraph that the origin of morality has been examined throughout history, and “that humans have need to get along with each other.” You add that we have evolved complex systems to do so. But then out of left field comes your conclusion that this speaks in favor of atheism. Sorry, Damian, but there is no logical rule of inference that will permit you to derive atheism from the fact that humans need to get along with each other and that they have complex systems for doing so. You say that morality existed before religious texts. I agree, and never argued otherwise. This doesn’t show that moral realism is false, nor does it reconcile atheism and moral realism.
Finally, you say that I’m asking of Hitchens’s particular challenge that it “make a complete case for atheism”. Don’t you think that’s stretching it, Damian? I asked nothing of the sort. But perhaps you can quote me where you think I did.
Just to make one final thing clear about my position:
You are perhaps right, Heraplem, to say that no intelligent theist thinks that theists are more moral than atheists. But the world (and especially America), sadly enough, is full of not so intelligent theists, and many of them do in fact think that atheists are morally inferior. It still seems to me that Hitchens could be aiming at them, and not at “intelligent” theists. And it seems to me that this is a perfectly reasonable thing to be doing. Keep in mind, his book is a bestseller, meaning a lot of his audience are the laymen, and the philosophically uninitiated. Fair enough?
Nadroj,
To be clear, what I actually said is that I know of no intelligent theist who believes that atheists are literally incapable of performing right or wrong actions.
In any case, your view does sound fair enough. I’d go a step further: given that Hitchens relies so much on rhetorical fluff, entertaining sound bites, red herrings, non-arguments, and other superficialities and offenses to reason, one can’t help but suspect that he is counting on an uncritical audience. And this makes it all the more appropriate to point out that he hasn’t engaged the real issues.
Sorry for misreading you there, Heraplem. I suppose I had a point I was wanting to make, and forgot to make sure you were arguing the contrary
Anyway… I think this all depends on what you regard as the “real issues.” Obviously, us academic types tend to think that things like metaethical theories are the real issues, but Hitchens is far more a politician than a philosopher, it seems to me, even if perhaps he would be loath to admit it. And I think his “challenge” is worthwhile to present to a great deal of Americans, who think that the fact that a person is an atheist is sufficient to show their moral depravity, or at least inferiority. If there are indeed people who believe this (and I think there are), then Hitchens might not be just missing the point — he might be aiming for a different point.
As a sidenote, I admit to playing a little devil’s advocate here. Though I am an atheist, I generally don’t much like guys like Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens, not least because they turn out to be more like politicians than philosophers. But, I think that what Hitchens is addressing is indeed a “real issue,” unfortunate though that may be.
Of course, he’s been broadcasting his challenge for any theists, not a mere subset of Americans, say, who happen to believe that atheists can’t perform moral actions. But you see, even if he were explicitly using the challenge to target such a subset of Americans, it’s all the more appropriate to respond by pointing out that many intellectuals believe there’s a deeper and more relevant conflict between morality and atheism than the one Hitchens chooses to focus on. His challenge may be answered with ease by affirming the possibility that both atheists and theists can be good people, and then raising some fundamental metaethical considerations.
I have seen american polls that say that most would not vote an athiest into office. This is a very real issue and has more practical purposes then talking about the metaphysical. I would say that issue is less important then the political one, lets get everyone to the point were they agree that athiest can be as moral as theiest then we can focus on the “important” issues.
I’d like to see where Hitchens made this odd challenge. Of all the challenges on this subject to pose, he chose THAT one?
Glenn,
Hitchens has made the challenge a number of times, appearing frequently as he does in public debate.
You can find a transcript of such along with an appropriate referring link here:
http://religionandatheism.wordpress.com/2007/08/07/hitchens-challenge-name-a-moral-action-an-atheist-couldnt-perform/
Also a Google search using keywords “hitchens” and “challenge” would provide you with some useful hits.
Here is a logical response and explanation to Hitchens’ Challenge:
http://www.kohen.com/2007/11/christopher-hitchens-answered.html
But, for simplicity… Here is the short answer:
“Name an ethical statement or action, made or performed by a person of faith, that could not have been made or performed by a nonbeliever.” -Christopher Hitchens
A moral action that a believer can perform than an unbeliever cannot is to “Give faithful testimony of God while their credibility is established through their obedience to His commands.”
That’s easy to answer: Doing anything good for God’s glory and not one’s own.
“A moral action that a believer can perform than an unbeliever cannot is to “Give faithful testimony of God while their credibility is established through their obedience to His commands.””
mark: How is this a moral action, especially if your god does not exist? Especially if you have offered nada evidence for the existence of your concept of god. I do not accept your answer as a moral action because someone who believes in Zeus or the flying spagetti monster as thier god could give this same answer as you did. Would anyones faithful testimony count, meaning could anyone following any religion make this statement and be accurate?
Also exactly what does bieng obedient to gods commands mean? What commands are you refering to?