Very interesting. I wonder, though, if one is able to reply that propositions supervene naturally on a certain state or set of relations (specifically in the brain). Hopefully we see more on this.
Very interesting. I wonder, though, if one is able to reply that propositions supervene naturally on a certain state or set of relations (specifically in the brain). Hopefully we see more on this.
Of course they might. But then would they inherit the causal power of their supervenience base? Or would they, as I suspect, be epiphenomenal?
I can’t answer that definitively, but mightn’t a Broadian version of emergence help shed some light on that particular problem? Perhaps there are novel causal powers that emerge with propositional attitudes. I suspect not, but it seems that there are some that would answer that objection this way (Timothy O’Connor, for example).
I find it hard to believe that in a naturalistic world brand new laws suddenly show up just in time to bring free moral agents into existence.